Varieties of Capitalism, Increasing Income Inequality, and the Sustainability of Long-Run Growth

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Mark Setterfield† and Yun K. Kim‡

Abstract

We model US household debt accumulation during the neoliberal boom as a response to emulation effects and the decline of the social wage, which has “privatized” an increasing share of the costs of providing for services such as health and education. The debt dynamics of the US economy are then studied under alternative assumptions about the configuration of distributional variables, which is shown to differ across varieties of capitalism that have “neoliberalized” to different degrees. A key result is that distributional change alone will not make US neoliberal capitalism financially sustainable due, in part, to the paradoxical nature of inequality as a spur to household borrowing, and hence a source of both demand-formation and financial fragility. Achieving sustainability requires, instead, more wide-ranging reform.

Key words: Varieties of capitalism, neoliberalism, inequality, growth, financial fragility, financial sustainability

JEL classifications: E12, E44, O41

1 Introduction

It is commonly argued that the relatively rapid growth of the US economy 1990-2007 owed, in part, to the willingness of less-affluent households to borrow in order to offset the otherwise

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negative impact on consumption spending of increased income inequality (Palley, 2002; Cynamon and Fazzari, 2008; Brown, 2008; Barba and Pivetti, 2009; Wisman, 2013; Setterfield, 2013). A number of these contributions—conceived and written before 2008—anticipate the Great Recession as a consequence of the exhaustion of an unsustainable debt-financed, consumption-led growth regime (see also Godley and Izurieta (2002)). Since the crisis, much attention has been paid to the inequality-debt-crisis nexus in a varied and still-growing literature (Kumhof and Rancière, 2010; Rajan, 2010; van Treeck, 2014; Kirschenmann et al., 2014; Bartolini et al., 2014).

According to Setterfield and Kim (2016) and Setterfield et al. (2016), in the presence of emulation effects in consumption behavior and fundamental uncertainty about the long-term consequences of debt accumulation, rising income inequality of the sort witnessed in the US since 1980 can boost growth but simultaneously undermine the sustainability of the growth process. This last result is shown to be sensitive to the way that net debtor households organize their debt servicing obligations (together with their related consumption and saving from current income). In particular, and in keeping with empirical evidence on the way that households respond to financial distress (Lusardi et al., 2011), if net debtors sacrifice savings whenever debt-servicing obligations, the sustainability of growth in the face of an increase in income inequality is adversely affected.

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it revisits the motivation for borrowing by less affluent households. In Setterfield and Kim (2016) and Setterfield et al. (2016), net debtor worker households seek to borrow from positive net worth rentier households because of emulation effects that, in the presence of real wage stagnation, increase their satisficing target levels of consumption expenditure at a pace that exceeds the growth of consumption spending that can be funded by wage income. But as explained by Lapavitsas and Powell (2013, p.364), “households have been pushed into the arms of the private financial system as public provision has retreated across a range of fields and real incomes have been broadly stagnant”. In other words, part of the motivation for borrowing stems not from “keeping
up with the Joneses” but from what we call “running to stand still”: a desire to maintain access to, for example, higher education and health care, and in so doing to simply maintain (rather than advance) household welfare, even as the costs of these services are shifted from the public sector onto individual households.

The second purpose is to extend the investigation to reflect spatial dimensions of neoliberalism. To what extent has the “neoliberalization” of capitalism been geographically variegated and how (if at all) does this affect the inequality-debt-crisis nexus? It is well known that the epicenters of the 2007-2009 financial crisis and Great Recession were the US and UK, two “liberal market economies” (Hall and Soskice, 2001) where, by 2007, neoliberalism was most advanced and where increases in income inequality have been most pronounced over the last thirty-five years. Even as “coordinated market economies” (Hall and Soskice, 2001) such as Germany have become increasingly neoliberal over the past 35 years (on which see Anselmann and Krämer (2015)), have there been limits to increases in inequality in these economies? And if so, would the neoliberal growth process in a liberal market economy such as the US have been made more robust by exposure to the more tempered increases in inequality experienced in coordinated market economies during the neoliberal era? In short, have varieties of capitalism persisted during the neoliberal era reflected in differing degrees of neoliberalism, and can this be shown to meaningfully affect the character and/or sustainability of the neoliberal growth process?

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we outline the basic model on which our analysis is based. We highlight the impact of the social wage on household borrowing, and call attention to features of the debt dynamics of the system as whole. In section 3, a numerical analysis is used to investigate the impact on the financial sustainability of US neoliberal capitalism of changes in key distributional variables. These changes are motivated by observed differences in the distributional regimes that have emerged during the neoliberal era in the US and Germany, archetypes of “liberal market” and “coordinated

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1See also Behringer and van Treeck (2017) and Bizberg (2018) for evidence of growing interest in this question.
market” economies in the varieties of capitalism literature (Hall and Soskice, 2001). We show that while US capitalism would benefit from the less extreme distributional outcomes associated with other varieties of capitalism, more thorough-going reform is required in order to render the US neoliberal growth regime sustainable. Finally, section 4 concludes.

2 The model

2.1 Firm and household behavior

The model in this paper is based on the stock-flow consistent Kaleckian macrodynamic model of Setterfield and Kim (2016) and Setterfield et al. (2016). The model is demand-led, and we focus here on the contribution of firms and (in particular) households to demand formation.

Firms contribute to demand formation according to an investment function of the following form (Stockhammer, 1999):

\[ g_K = \kappa_0 + \kappa_r r \]  

(1)

where \( g_K = I/K \) is the rate of accumulation (aggregate investment, \( I \), per unit of the capital stock, \( K \)) and \( r \) is the rate of profit. This investment function is Robinsonian or “neo-Keynesian” rather than Kaleckian, since it lacks the independent accelerator term – through which the rate of accumulation varies directly with the rate of capacity utilization independently of the profit rate – that is associated with the canonical Kaleckian growth model.³. Unlike the standard Robinsonian growth model (Robinson, 1956), however, long run variability of the rate of capacity utilization is assumed in what follows. As demonstrated in Setterfield and Kim (2017), in tandem with equation (1), this makes the resulting model stagnationist but renders the growth rate invariant with respect to the profit share, so that initially growth is neither wage- nor profit-led. Since our concern is with the effects of

²Accounting relationships demonstrating the stock-flow consistency of the model developed in this paper are summarized in the social accounting matrices (Tables 2 and 3) found in Appendix A of this paper.

³See, for example, Lavoie (2014, chpt.6)
inequality on macrodynamics when households borrow, we regard this as a suitably neutral starting point for our investigation.

Given that:

\[ r = \pi u \]  

(2)
equation (1) can be re-written (upon substitution) as:

\[ g_K = \kappa_0 + \kappa_r \pi u \]  

(3)

Turning now to household behavior, following Setterfield and Kim (2016) and Setterfield et al. (2016) we posit two classes of income recipients: positive net worth rentier households (made up of capitalists and managers), and negative net worth worker households. Rentier households consume a conventional fraction of their income, which consists of profit, managerial salaries, and interest income from loans to working households. Worker households likewise consume a conventional fraction of their (wage) income, but also consume by borrowing from rentiers. Workers’ borrowing behavior is motivated by their propensity to emulate the consumption of rentiers, and also by a desire to maintain consumption in the face of any diminution of social provision. In other words, part of the motivation for increased borrowing by workers is understood to be the “privatization” of social provision – reductions in the social wage (cuts to health care, education etc.) associated with “rolling back the frontiers of the welfare state” that have increasingly shifted the burden of providing for certain basic services from the public sector onto individual households.

First, note that total household income can be written as:

\[ Y = W_p N + W_s \alpha N + \Pi \]  

(4)

\footnote{The decomposition of the rate of profit that follows can be treated as true by definition, or can alternatively be viewed as a behavioral equation that, in Kaleckian macrodynamics, embeds the relationship between the profit share of income and the mark up applied to unit costs by firms in the process of mark-up pricing.}
where \( W_p \) is the real wage of production workers, \( N \) is the number of production workers employed, \( W_s \) is the real wage of supervisory workers, \( \alpha < 1 \) denotes the necessary ratio of managers to production workers (given by the technology of the production process), and \( \Pi \) denotes total profit income. As noted, we treat the three types of income recipients (production and non-supervisory workers, supervisory workers, and capitalists) as two distinct types of households (working and rentier households), so that \( W_s \alpha N + \Pi \) becomes the income of rentiers (capitalists and supervisory workers). Furthermore, the fixed real wage earned by supervisory workers is assumed to be a constant multiple of the real wage of production workers:

\[
W_s = \phi W_p, \quad \phi > 1
\]  

so that total real wage income is:

\[
W = (1 + \phi \alpha) W_p N
\]

Denoting the profit share of income as \( \pi \) and the income share of production workers as \( \omega_p \), it follows that:

\[
1 - \pi = (1 + \phi \alpha) \omega_p
\]

\[
\Rightarrow \omega_p = \frac{1 - \pi}{1 + \phi \alpha} \tag{7}
\]

Aggregate consumption by households is written as:

\[
C = C_W + C_R + \dot{D}
\]

where \( C_W \) and \( C_R \) are consumption out of profit and/or wage income by working and rentier households, and borrowing by working households to finance additional consumption (independently of their income) is denoted as \( \dot{D} \). Borrowing by working households is then
modeled as:
\[ \dot{D} = \beta (C^T - C_W), \beta > 0 \] (9)

where \(\beta\) is an adjustment parameter that depends on various factors including both household borrowing and financial market lending norms. \(C^T\) is a target level of consumption to which working households aspire. In our model, this target level of consumption is influenced by two factors. The first is the level of consumption achieved by more affluent households. These familiar emulation effects (“keeping up with the Joneses”) can result from direct imitation of the consumption patterns of the most affluent households, or more indirectly through “expenditure cascades” (Cynamon and Fazzari, 2008; Frank et al., 2014). The second factor influencing the consumption target \(C^T\) is the size of the social wage – i.e., the extent of public provision of services such as health care and education. We postulate that \(C^T\) varies inversely with the social wage: as public provision of services such health and education diminishes, households must increase their target level of private consumption expenditures in order to merely maintain established consumption standards. We refer to this process as “running to stand still”. Ultimately, both “keeping up with the Joneses” and “running to stand still” drive \(C^T\) (and hence borrowing by working households). We therefore write:

\[ C^T = \eta C^R - \omega_s \] (10)

where \(\omega_s\) denotes the social wage and the parameter \(\eta\) represents the propensity to emulate.

Note that for \(\omega_s > 0\) sufficiently large it is possible to obtain \(C^T < 0\) – in other words,

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5The empirical significance of emulation effects as a driver of household debt accumulation has been contested recently by Stockhammer and Wildauer (2017), but see Thompson (2018); Petach and Tavani (2017) and Berlemann and Salland (2016) for contrary evidence.

6The rising tide of student debt in the US is an example of this process, whereby “cost shifting” from the public sector to the household sector results in households accumulating more debt in an effort to maintain their standards of living. See, for example, Webber and Burns (2017). As remarked by Lapavitsas (2013, p.240), “rising household indebtedness has been associated with changes in the social provision of basic services including housing, health, education, transport and so on. To the degree to which social provision has retreated, or failed to expand, private provision has taken its place, mediated by finance.”
with a sufficiently generous social wage, workers aspire to a target level of saving out of current net wage income. The stylized facts of the neoliberal era suggest that this condition is not satisfied, however, and that for worker households as a whole \( \eta C_R - \omega S > 0 \), implying that \( C^T - C_W > 0 \) so that \( \dot{D} > 0 \). We therefore assume that \( C^T - C_W > 0 \Rightarrow \dot{D} > 0 \) in order to capture the neoliberal phenomenon of less affluent households as a whole steadily accumulating debt by virtue of their reliance on credit to supplement stagnant real incomes in order to finance growing consumption expenditures.\(^7\)

Next, we model the social wage as:

\[
\omega_S = t\Pi
\]

Equation (11) describes the social wage as being entirely funded by a proportional tax \( t \) on total profits, so that the public sector runs a balanced budget. Effectively, the public sector acts as an “intermediary” between capitalist and worker households, taxing profits and redistributing the resulting revenues to workers, accumulating no net worth in the process. This is not intended to be a realistic depiction of public provision in the US, where the social wage received by working households has typically been financed by tax revenues paid by the same households, with the result that it plays no inter-class redistributive role (Shaikh and Tonak (1987, 2000), Shaikh (2003) – but see also Moos (2017) for a new view). Instead, equation (11) is motivated as follows. First, the stylized facts of recent US capitalism draw attention to the coincidence, during the neoliberal era, of tax cuts for the most affluent households coupled with a process of shifting the costs of providing health care and education (among other things) from the public sector to the household sector (“rolling back the frontiers of the welfare state”). Note that in equation (11), the social wage varies directly with the rate of taxation on profits, so that the equation is capable of capturing these coincident developments through a decline in a single parameter, \( t \). It is, therefore, a parsimonious

\(^7\)Note, then, that our focus is exclusively on the use of credit to finance current consumption. We abstract from that part of debt used by working households to accumulate assets (and in particular, housing).
representation of two important features of neoliberalism. Second, we wish to capture the notion that, hypothetically, the US could use (increased) taxes on top incomes to fund the public provision of basic services to working households. In this way, equation (11) serves as a useful counter-factual (at least according to the evidence of Shaikh and Tonak (1987, 2000), and Shaikh (2003)), drawing attention to the opportunity cost of tax cuts for the most affluent members of society. In the context of our model, this opportunity cost includes not only the reduced burden on working households for providing basic services such as health and education, but also (given the implications for household borrowing and debt accumulation) enhanced sustainability of the growth regime.

As a result of their borrowing, working households accumulate debt that they must, of course, service. Following Setterfield and Kim (2016), we describe workers’ debt-servicing behavior as conforming to a distinct hierarchy or “pecking order”, according to which they first consume from current income, then service their debts, and finally save. The flow of savings per period is thus a “residual of a residual” – that part of total income that remains after consumption and debt servicing expenditures. The motivation for this behavior can be found in Cynamon and Fazzari (2012) and Lusardi et al. (2011). Cynamon and Fazzari (2012) argue that debt servicing expenditures by households are better thought of as a monetary outlay undertaken volitionally by households, rather than an autonomous deduction from gross household income (in the manner of a tax). At the same time, Lusardi et al. (2011) observe that “just as corporations tend to fund themselves first by drawing upon internal funds, households address financial shocks first by drawing down savings” (Lusardi et al., 2011, p.27). In other words, it seems reasonable to assume that it is savings specifically, rather than household income more generally, that is sacrificed in response to an increase in creditors’ claims on debtor households.

In light of these considerations, we describe consumption out of wage income by workers as:

\[ C_w = c_w W_p N \]  \hspace{1cm} (12)
while saving by the same households ($S_W$) becomes:

$$S_W = (1 - c_W)W_pN - iD_R$$ (13)

where $D_R = D - D_W$ is that part of total workers’ debt ($D$) that is owned by rentiers. Note that even as they borrow and accumulate debt, workers save and accumulate assets. These assets are assumed to be exclusively some part of the total debt of other working households (denoted as $D_W$). As a class, then, the transfer payment that workers must make to rentiers in order to service their debts is of size $iD_R$.

Finally, the consumption of rentier households is described as a fixed proportion of their total wage, profit, and interest income:

$$C_R = c_r[\phi \alpha WP_N + (1 - t)\Pi + iD_R]$$ (14)

### 2.2 Model solution

Goods market equilibrium in our model can be stated as:

$$Y = C_W + C_R + \dot{D} + G + I$$ (15)

where $I = g_K K$. Equilibrium values of the rate of capacity utilization, rate of profit, and rate of growth can now be found by combining equations (1), (2), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12), and (14) with the equilibrium condition stated in equation (15) above, and normalizing all variables by the capital stock. This exercise is undertaken in Appendix B of this paper.

Note that the equilibrium solutions derived in Appendix B are strictly short-run or temporary equilibria, in the sense that they assume a constant net debt to capital ratio, $d_R = \frac{D_R}{K}$. This net debt to capital ratio will, however, vary endogenously over time, as workers accumulate

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8Workers thus accumulate no equity, so that the capital stock is owned exclusively by capitalists.

9Recall that workers owe only some fraction of their total debt to rentier households – hence $d_R$ is a net debt to capital ratio.
debt and the economy grows. It is to the examination of these debt dynamics and their implications for growth that we now turn.

2.3 Debt dynamics

Recall that the consumption, debt servicing, and saving behavior of workers implies that:

\[ S_W = (1 - c_W)W_pN - iD_R \]

Saving is a “residual of a residual” – what remains after debtor households have first consumed and then serviced their debts from their available wage income. Given this behavior, it follows that workers’ maximum feasible debt servicing payment, \( iD_{R\text{max}} \), satisfies:

\[ 0 = (1 - c_W)W_pN - iD_{R\text{max}} \]

Standardizing by \( K \) and solving for the resulting maximum net debt to capital ratio, we find that:

\[ d_{R\text{max}} = \frac{(1 - c_W)\omega_pu}{i} \]

As long as \( d_R \leq d_{R\text{max}} \), workers can service their debts and subject to the “ordinary” workings of financial markets (that allow accumulated debt to be rolled over from period to period), function as Minskyan speculative units. If, however, \( d_R > d_{R\text{max}} \), and assuming that \( C_W \) in equation (12) is required for the basic social reproduction of the household from period to period (so that the propensity to consume, \( c_W \), cannot be reduced), then working households become “Lehman units” (Pressman and Scott, 2018). This describes a point at which households “cannot sustain themselves and also pay interest on past debts” (Pressman and Scott, 2018, p.10), and are therefore susceptible to default.\(^{10}\) Lehman finance

\(^{10}\)If \( C_W \) is not required for basic social reproduction then households cannot be categorized as Lehman units when \( d_R = d_{R\text{max}} \): \( d_{R\text{max}} \) is a local (rather than global) constraint that can be relaxed by reducing \( c_W \) in order to avoid default. Note, however, that a reduction in \( c_W \) is not without consequences for demand-
so-defined falls short of Minsky’s concept of Ponzi finance, a situation where debt-servicing obligations exceed current income so that the debtor unit must borrow merely in order to service previously accumulated debt. Households cannot realistically approach such a position, however, because it involves devoting all current income to debt servicing, and “households, unlike firms, need food, clothing, and shelter in order to survive” (Pressman and Scott, 2018, p.10). The concept of Lehman finance, and the prospect that a Lehman unit is likely to default, draws attention to the fact that a capitalist growth regime that depends on household (as opposed to corporate) debt accumulation is more susceptible to problems of financial fragility, which problem is more likely to become pressing before debtor units approach the threshold of Ponzi finance. The significance in practice of this observation will become clear in what follows.

Having identified its maximum feasible value in equation (16), we can identify the steady state value of the net debt to capital ratio, \( d^*_R \), by studying the behavior of:

\[
d_R = \frac{D_R}{K}
\]

\[
\Rightarrow \dot{d}_R = \frac{\dot{D}_R}{K} - g_K d_R
\]  

under the equilibrium condition \( \dot{d}_R = 0 \), where \( \dot{D}_R \) is that part of workers’ total borrowing that is funded by the savings of rentier households. In other words:

\[
\dot{D}_R = \dot{D} - \dot{D}_W
\]  

where \( \dot{D}_W = S_W \) is borrowing by workers that is funded by savings generated by other working households. Explicit solution of equation (17) is provided in Appendix C of this formation, and hence the steady-state value of the capacity utilization rate that appears on the right hand side of (16), and hence the value of \( d_{R_{\text{max}}} \). How “soft” a “soft landing” of this sort would be is, therefore, open to question – which question we leave for future research.

11Of course, firms need to pay wages and acquire material inputs (as well as meet their debt servicing obligations) in order to remain in operation, but such needs for working capital are – unlike the basic needs of households – ordinarily financed by borrowing.
Inspection of (17) reveals that if $g_K$ is increasing in $d_R$, then $\dot{d}_R$ will vary indirectly with $d_R$ at higher values of $d_R$, and the debt dynamics of the system will be of the “unconventional” (inverted U-shape) type as shown in figure 1.\(^\text{12}\) This is significant because equation (17) is typically quadratic, and unconventional debt dynamics mean that it is the larger of the two equilibrium solutions of this expression that is stable, reducing the likelihood (ceteris paribus) that such position can feasibly be attained. Meanwhile, the explicit solution of equation (17) in Appendix C reveals that the “running to stand still” effect on the proclivity of working households to borrow means that the value of $\dot{d}_R$ varies indirectly with the rate of taxation on profits, $t$. This is for two distinct reasons. First, a decrease in $t$ results in a lower social wage (through equation (11)) which stimulates more borrowing (via equation (10)), as workers try to make up for the loss of publicly-provided consumption goods by increasing private expenditures to defend their standard of living. Second, a decrease in $t$ raises capitalist consumption (in equation (14)), which stimulates worker borrowing and spending through the emulation effect in equation (10). Having thus elucidated the debt

\[ \begin{align*}
\dot{d}_R &= \frac{\partial F}{\partial d_R} \\
&= \frac{\partial}{\partial d_R} \left( \frac{F}{\partial d_R} \right)
\end{align*} \]

\[ \begin{align*}
\dot{d}_R &= \frac{\partial F}{\partial d_R} \\
&= \frac{\partial}{\partial d_R} \left( \frac{F}{\partial d_R} \right)
\end{align*} \]

Figure 1: Debt dynamics and macroeconomic sustainability

\(^{12}\)As will become clear from the numerical solutions of equation (C.5) in the following section, this is, in fact, the case.
dynamics of the system, we can now turn to address two key questions: is $d_{R_{max}} \geq d^*_R$; and if so, how large is the value of $d_{R_{max}} - d^*_R$? The first question addresses the sustainability of the growth regime, by identifying whether or not the steady state value of the net debt to income ratio is feasible (so that the system can, in principle, achieve and remain in its steady state configuration). In figure 1, for example, if $d_{R_{max}} = d_{R_{max1}}$, then as long as $d_R \leq d_{R_{max1}}$ initially, the economy will converge to the stable, steady state debt to capital ratio $d_{R1}$ and the accompanying steady-state growth rate will be sustainable indefinitely (ceteris paribus). If, however, $d_{R_{max}} = d_{R_{max2}}$, then even if $d_R \leq d_{R_{max2}}$ initially, unless it is also the case that $d_R < d_{R2}$ (in which case the economy will move towards a situation in which working households cease to be net debtors), the stability of $d_{R1}$ will eventually pull the debt to capital ratio above its maximum sustainable value.

The second question concerns the vulnerability of the economy to shocks. In the case of $d_{R_{max}} > d^*_R$, the larger the value of $d_{R_{max}} - d^*_R$, the greater the capacity of the economy to sustain shocks to the net debt to capital ratio without these shocks rendering the debt servicing payments of working households infeasible (given the way we have described their consumption, debt servicing, and saving behavior). These questions are taken up in the following section.

### 3 Numerical results

The results of our previous research into the characteristics and sustainability of household-debt-financed growth regimes were based on numerical solutions to equations akin to (16) and (C.5) (Setterfield and Kim, 2016; Setterfield et al., 2016). Our first objective in this section is therefore to add to the parameter set of this previous work to incorporate values of the tax.
rate, $t$, and re-calibrate key distributional parameters to account for the characteristics of the German economy. This will first allow us to identify whether or not there exist meaningfully different “distributional regimes” across different varieties of capitalism during the neoliberal era. If successful, we can then examine the sensitivity of US macrodynamics to the differing degrees of neoliberalism associated with the different distributional characteristics of (US and German) varieties of capitalism. The specific question we seek to address is: do different “distributional regimes” affect the sustainability and vulnerability to shocks of a household-debt-financed neoliberal growth regime and, in particular, how would US capitalism have fared during the 1990-2007 neoliberal boom with a distributional regime more characteristic of German neoliberal capitalism?

3.1 Degrees of neoliberalism across varieties of capitalism

Table 1 reports the parameter values used in this study and their sources.\textsuperscript{14} Of particular interest here are the values highlighted in red, which reflect different facets of the distributional regimes in the US and Germany during the period 1990-2007. It is the sensitivity of neoliberal debt dynamics to these distributional regimes that we wish to gauge. Comparing the parameter values in columns two and three of table 1 suggests a clear contrast between the US and German economies. Distributional outcomes have worsened in Germany over time as the German economy has neoliberalized (Anselmann and Krämer, 2015), but in general Germany is less unequal than the US. This is reflected in the values of key parameters

\textsuperscript{14}Following Setterfield and Kim (2016), we calculate $\eta$ – the propensity of working households to emulate the consumption of the rentier class – as:

$$\eta = \lambda \delta$$

where $\lambda$ is Ravina’s emulation parameter (see Ravina (2007)), and $\delta$ is a scaling parameter defined as the ratio of consumption by the upper-middle class (capitalists and the working rich) to consumption by the median rentier family, and proxied by the ratio of CEO pay to median rentier household income. The presence of $\delta$ in our calculation of $\eta$ allows us to take account of the extent to which the consumption standards of the very affluent affect the aspirations of working households. This influence may be direct, arising from exposure to much-publicized “celebrity lifestyles” or the propensity of working households to believe in upward social mobility (and the resulting need to consume in accordance with their expected future social status) (Wisman, 2009, 2013). Alternatively, it may be indirect, resulting from the “expenditure cascades” discussed by Frank et al. (2014).
such as $\phi$ and $\pi$ (the ratio of supervisory to production worker wages and the profit share of income, respectively), both of which are lower in Germany, and $\omega_p$ and $t$ (the wage share of supervisory workers and the tax rate on top incomes, respectively), both of which are higher.$^{15}$

One important exception to this generalization is the real interest rate, $i$, which is almost twice as high in Germany as in the US. Interest rates are, of course, distributional variables in so far as they inevitably set up flows of transfer payments between debtors and creditors. According to some Post Keynesian analysis, however, interest rates are primarily distributional variables (rather than primarily determinants of the level of activity), despite their prominent contemporary use as a tool of macroeconomic stabilization policy (Rogers, 1989; Lavoie, 1992). In this regard, the German economy is unequivocally more pro-rentier than the US economy. To a substantial extent this is, of course, the by-product of macroeconomic policy rather than any explicit distributional objective: the European Central Bank (ECB) has been more aggressively focused on targeting low inflation during the neoliberal era than the more accommodative Federal Reserve Bank, and this has translated into different interest rate regimes in Germany and the US by virtue of the fact that both central banks use an overnight rate as the primary instrument of their monetary policies.

The conclusion that emerges from this review of the parameter values in Table 1 is that neoliberalism is gradable: it has differed by degree across countries in accordance with pre-existing notions of “varieties of capitalism”. This conclusion is congruent with the findings of Boyer (2015, 2016), who identifies contrasting regimes of inequality between countries during the neoliberal era, rather than undifferentiated increases in inequality based on a universal or global (and therefore spatially invariant) mechanism.

$^{15}$These findings are consistent with other measures of distributional outcomes. For example, compared to the US, Germany engages in consistently higher levels of public social spending as a share of GDP. See the OECD social expenditure database (http://www.oecd.org/social/expenditure.htm) for more detail.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value (US)</th>
<th>Value (Germany)</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>$c_W$</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Author’s calculations based on Bunting (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$c_\pi$</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Setterfield and Budd (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Author’s calculations$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda$</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ravina (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta$</td>
<td>74.89</td>
<td>61.06</td>
<td>Author’s calculations based on Mishel and Sabadish (2012), Anselmann and Krämer (2015), Melcher (2016)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\phi$</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>Author’s calculations based on Mishel et al. (2007), Anselmann and Krämer (2015)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Author’s calculations based on (Mishel et al., 2007, p.118)</td>
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<td>$\omega_p$</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.485</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\pi$</td>
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<td>0.29</td>
<td>Setterfield and Budd (2011), Anselmann and Krämer (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\kappa_0$</td>
<td>0.015 or</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Author’s calculations$^b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0805</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\kappa_r$</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Lavoie and Godley (2001), Skott and Ryoo (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$i$</td>
<td>0.0481</td>
<td>0.0871</td>
<td>Author’s calculations based on World Bank Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$f$</td>
<td>0.375</td>
<td>0.491</td>
<td>Author’s calculations based on Anselmann and Krämer (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta$</td>
<td>21.72</td>
<td>17.71</td>
<td>Calculated as $\eta = \lambda \delta$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

$a$. Set in accordance with other parameters to satisfy the Keynesian stability condition.  
$b$. Set in accordance with other parameters to yield a capacity utilization rate of approximately 80 per cent.
3.2 US neoliberal capitalism

We now consider the implications of different distributional regimes for neoliberal debt dynamics, and the question as to whether or not the neoliberal growth regime is sustainable. We start with the basic configuration from Setterfield and Kim (2016) representing US neoliberal capitalism during the period 1990-2007 (which we take to be the archetype of neoliberalism), but now with a hypothetical social wage paid for by a tax on profits. As previously noted, the social wage has traditionally been funded by workers themselves (Shaikh and Tonak, 1987, 2000; Shaikh, 2003). Here we study the effect of a counter-factual social wage funded by a tax on top incomes. The purpose of this exercise is to investigate whether or not there is a simple policy solution – redistributive fiscal policy, at tax rates associated with existing US neoliberal capitalism – to the unsustainability of the US neoliberal growth regime reported by Setterfield and Kim (2016)?

The debt dynamics of this first regime are illustrated in Figure 2. As anticipated, these debt dynamics are “unconventional” (inverted U-shape), precisely the qualitative property called to attention by Setterfield and Kim (2016) and associated with the debt servicing behavior of working households described earlier. The significance of this observation is that the larger of the two equilibrium values of the net debt to capital ratio, found in Figure 2 where the relationship between the rate of change of the net debt to capital ratio and its level intercepts the abscissa, is the stable equilibrium value of this ratio. This stable equilibrium value, denoted as $d_R^*$, is the focus of attention in what follows.

In Figure 2, we observe $d_R^* = 1.00$, with an associated value of $d_Y^* = 2.99$. As a point of comparison, note that the middle three quintiles of the US wealth distribution, with household net worth of between $200 and $473 000, had a debt to income ratio of 1.57 in 2007 (Wolff, 2010, Table 6). More significantly, recall from equation (16) that:

\[16\] As noted in Setterfield et al. (2016), the debt dynamics of the system convert to the more orthodox U-shape observed elsewhere in the literature (see, for example, Hein (2012, pp.94-8)) if working households first use their wage income to service debt, and then consume a conventional fraction of what remains.
\[
d_{R_{\text{max}}} = \frac{(1 - c_W)\omega_p u}{i}
\]

Consistent with the outcomes depicted Figure 2, we find on the basis of this calculation that, evaluated at the steady-state rate of capacity utilization, \(d_{R_{\text{max}}} = 0.25\), so that \(d_{R_{\text{max}}} - d_R^* = -0.75\). In other words, regardless of the implied debt to income ratio for working households, the steady state debt burden associated with this regime is infeasible. The conclusion is straightforward: introduction of a social wage funded by a tax on top incomes at prevailing US rates does not suffice to make the US neoliberal growth regime sustainable.

![Figure 2: The baseline case: US neoliberal capitalism](image)

3.3 US neoliberalism with German taxation

Does a “less neoliberalized” (i.e., more generous) welfare state, such as that found in Germany, improve on the situation just described? Specifically, can more aggressive redistribution through taxes and transfers make the US neoliberal growth regime sustainable and eliminate (or at least appreciably reduce) the debt burden placed on working households, so that the resulting system is at least to some extent “shock proof”?\(^{17}\) We begin the process of

\(^{17}\)Recall that by “shock proof” we mean a situation where the equilibrium debt burden is sufficiently within the interior of its maximum feasible value as to permit a substantial disequilibrating increase in the
addressing the questions just posed by modifying the previous configuration of our model to incorporate a larger social wage, funded by the higher German tax on top incomes reported in Table 1. All other parameters are unchanged from the second column of Table 1. The debt dynamics of the resulting system are illustrated in Figure 3.

In this configuration of the model, we observe $d_R^* = 0.81$ and $d_Y^* = 2.29$. Consistent with the higher rate of taxation and more aggressive redistribution through the social wage, then, we obtain a lower debt-to-income ratio for workers. These same distributive changes, moreover, bring about an increase in the steady-state capacity utilization rate (which rises from 80% in the baseline scenario discussed previously to 84%). This is consistent with ordinary Keynesian logic, according to which redistributing income from high- to low-income groups with (respectively) low and high marginal propensities to consume boosts demand formation and hence economic activity.\textsuperscript{18} Finally, since $d_{R_{max}} = 0.31$, the capacity of workers to carry debt is enhanced. Note, however, that while $d_{R_{max}} - d_R^* = -0.50$ is higher than in the baseline scenario, it is still negative and as such, the growth regime remains unsustainable. It appears, then, that in keeping with the claims of Taylor et al. (2015), redistributive fiscal policy alone cannot be relied upon to address the inequality created under neoliberalism and the macroeconomic ailments it entails. Specifically, although the higher German tax rate (and correspondingly higher social wage) has a moderating influence on US neoliberal capitalism, reducing both the steady-state debt burden of working households and the size of the “sustainability gap” (the interval that needs to be closed in order for the steady state debt burden of workers to be feasible, given by $-(d_{R_{max}} - d_R^*)$), it does not successfully address the fundamental problem of the innate unsustainability of the system as a whole.

\footnote{Note, however, that in the context of the present model, this result is far from assured. Hence the “traditional” channel through which redistribution from more- to less-affluent households affects consumption spending just described is now only one among several. For instance, a reduction in rentier consumption will lower the target level of consumption set by working households, which is influenced by emulation effects. Enhancement of the social wage brought about by redistributive taxation will have the same effect. Working together, these adjustments will (ceteris paribus) reduce borrowing by working households, and so adversely affect demand formation and economic activity.}
As a further experiment, we now transplant the entire German neoliberal distributional regime reported in the third column of Table 1 into neoliberal US capitalism. This involves modifying the previous configuration of our model (US neoliberalism with a higher social wage funded by a Germanic tax on top incomes) by introducing: more compressed income distribution (less wage inequality; less inequality in the functional distribution of income; and a smaller gap between top incomes and median income) and higher German (i.e., ECB) interest rates. The debt dynamics of the resulting system are illustrated in Figure 4.

An intriguing feature of this scenario is that macroeconomic performance unequivocally deteriorates. The equilibrium rate of capacity utilization drops to 81%. More significantly, we observe $dR^* = 1.23$ (so that $dy^* = 3.25$) and $d_{Rmax} = 0.10$, so that $d_{Rmax} - dR^* = -1.13$. In other words, the equilibrium debt-to-income ratio of workers rises and the maximum feasible debt-to-capital ratio falls, so that not only is the growth regime still unsustainable, but the sustainability gap actually widens.

These results demonstrate the central importance of monetary policy in a highly financialized, debt-dependent economy. The seemingly advantageous features of the German
distributional regime (which involves both higher taxes on top incomes and hence, in our model, a higher social wage, coupled with less pre-tax income inequality) are ultimately outweighed by higher interest rates, that set up a greater flow of transfer payments from worker to rentier households for any given amount of accumulated debt. As a result, equilibrium worker indebtedness rises and the steady-state debt burden of working households moves further away from its maximum feasible value. Ultimately, the source of these problems is the more “hawkish” attitude of the ECB towards inflation, and the correspondingly higher interest rate regime instituted by the ECB during the neoliberal era as compared to the US Federal Reserve Bank under Governors Greenspan and Bernanke. The results suggest that contrary to the claims of the first generation dynamic-stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models that guided monetary policy during the “Great Moderation”, central banks would do well to worry about the consequences for an indebted private sector of sudden increases in interest rates in the single-minded pursuit of lower inflation.\(^{19}\)

### 3.5 “Fully reformed” US neoliberalism

Suppose now that we retain the German distributional regime used in the previous subsection, but substitute the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy (as represented by the lower interest rate in the second column of Table 1) for that of the ECB. As might be expected, this relieves some of the financial stress on the system by reducing the steady-state debt burden of working households and increasing their maximum sustainable debt burden. It does not, however, make the growth regime sustainable. Meanwhile, it causes a marked deterioration in the real performance of the economy, captured by a precipitous decline in the steady-state

\(^{19}\)In first-generation DSGE models, debt is accumulated by consumption-smoothing households whose dynamic optimization rules out the possibility of default. In the model developed here, meanwhile, debt is accumulated by households seeking to offset the squeeze on their wage income created by neoliberal labour markets, under conditions that make the expected future consequences of debt accumulation subject to fundamental uncertainty. In the first environment, private sector balance sheets need be of no concern to monetary policy makers manipulating the interest rate. In the second – as amply demonstrated by the results in this sub-section – concern about the balance sheet consequences of higher interest rates is warranted. Fortunately, there is some evidence to suggest this lesson has been learned since the Great Recession (European Central Bank (2017, pp.14-16); Cloyne et al. (2018)).
capacity utilization rate. The intuition for this result is as follows. The logic of neoliberalism is such that it is heavily dependent on borrowing by workers to prop up demand formation that \((ceteris paribus)\) is undermined by high income inequality. As the squeeze on workers’ income emanating from the labour market and/or their debt-servicing obligations is reduced – and with it, their need to borrow – real performance suffers. This draws attention to a curious tension within neoliberalism: its financialization of less affluent households is both an unwanted source of financial fragility, and a necessary source of aggregate demand formation. Too great a squeeze on working households and the system becomes unsustainable; too little a squeeze and the system generates insufficient aggregate demand to be viable. In the situation considered here, lowering the interest rate \(ceteris paribus\) raises the economy-wide savings rate, by increasing that part of the residual of workers’ wage income that is saved rather than transferred to rentiers as debt servicing and hence partially spent. At the same time, this reduction in the rentiers transfer income and hence consumption spending reduces workers’ consumption target and hence borrowing. The net result is a veritable collapse in aggregate consumption demand. The motto of this unfortunate story is simple: just as we saw that aggressive monetary policy in the single-minded pursuit of an inflation target can imperil an indebted economy, so we now see that even accompanied by the “right” pre- and
post-tax labour market outcomes, a more enlightened monetary policy alone cannot solve the macroeconomic and financial ills of neoliberalism due to its paradoxical nature.

A policy solution is, however, at hand. Suppose that in addition to lowering the interest rate as postulated above, we also increase the value of $\kappa_0$ to the higher of the two values reported in the second row of Table 1. By construction, this restores the steady-state rate of capacity utilization to its original value (in the baseline simulation) of approximately 80%. Note that the parametric variation we are contemplating has an important behavioral interpretation. Given that $\kappa_0$ is the intercept term in our investment function (see equation (1)), it represents the rate of fixed capital formation that takes place independently of the profit rate. One interpretation of an increase in $\kappa_0$ is, therefore, a fiscal stimulus by the public sector in the form of an infrastructure policy.

Consider, then, the financial dynamics of a now “fully reformed” US neoliberalism involving not just Germanic labour market outcomes and a tax-and-transfer scheme based on a Germanic tax on top incomes, but also co-ordinated monetary and fiscal policies designed to keep interest rates low and to boost public spending by improving public infrastructure. The debt dynamics of this system are illustrated in Figure 5. Consistent with the outcomes depicted in this figure, we observe $d^*_R = 0.26$ and $d_{R_{max}} = 0.52$, so that $d_{R_{max}} - d^*_R = 0.26 > 0$. In other words, the equilibrium debt burden of workers falls considerably, their maximum feasible debt burden rises, and the former value now lies in the interior of the latter so that the growth regime is finally sustainable. Meanwhile, $d_Y^* = 0.68$, a value that is quite respectable compared to actual outcomes over the past four decades. It is less than half of the value of the debt to income ratio sustained by the middle three quintiles of the US wealth distribution in the early 2000s, and almost identical to the value of the debt to income ratio of the same group in 1983 (0.67), prior to the onset of the neoliberal era (Wolff, 2010, Table 6). Finally, there is reason to believe that the system would be reasonably shock-proof. Evaluated at the steady-state rate of capacity utilization, the value of $d_Y$ associated with $d_{R_{max}}$ is 1.36, meaning that starting from a position of equilibrium, the debt to income ratio
can double without creating “Lehman units” among working households and thus imposing the likelihood of default on the economy as a whole.

![Graph](image)

**Figure 5: “Fully reformed” US neoliberalism**

### 3.6 Summary

As we have seen, a “fully reformed” version of US neoliberal capitalism, involving Germanic labour market outcomes and taxes on top incomes, a monetary policy that is responsive to the needs of the real economy (and of debtor households), and a program of public expenditure on infrastructure, is required to create a sustainable growth regime. This result highlights the substantial extent to which US neoliberalism needs to be reformed merely in order to produce a variant of capitalism that “works” (i.e., a growth regime that is both financially robust and sustainable). Simply instituting a “moderated” variant of neoliberalism, as represented in the exercises above by a German distributional regime, does not suffice. Instead, what appears to be required is a mixture of more progressive labour market, monetary, and fiscal policies, where the latter involves not just redistributive taxation but also public spending directed towards infrastructure improvements.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{20}See also Bartolini et al. (2014, pp.1035-8) who go still further in their advocacy of change, suggesting that simultaneous reductions in the “consumption bias” of US society and in the time devoted to market work are also required in order to re-balance the US economy.
4 Conclusions

This paper draws attention to spatial variation in neoliberalism and, in particular, the extent to which we can identify differing “degrees of neoliberalism” in the contemporary distributional regimes of what have previously been identified as liberal market and coordinated market varieties of capitalism. The ultimate purpose is to study the impact of these variations on the deterioration of working households’ balance sheets resulting from rising income inequality and the retreat of the welfare state, and the impact of this financialization of the less affluent on the sustainability of growth.

The paper demonstrates that neoliberalization has been uneven: varieties of capitalism persist, at least as reflected in the differing distributional regimes of liberal market and coordinated market economies such as the US and Germany. Furthermore, these degrees of neoliberalism have an important but not decisive effect on the sustainability of the neoliberal growth regime. Although US neoliberalism would benefit from both more redistributive taxation on top incomes and less unequal labor market outcomes, a “fully reformed” US capitalism that also involves low interest rates and a program of public spending on infrastructure is required to produce a robust and financially sustainable growth regime.
## Appendix A  Social Accounting Matrices

### Table 2: Balance Sheet Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Workers</th>
<th>Rentiers</th>
<th>Firms</th>
<th>Banks</th>
<th>Sum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>$K$</td>
<td>$K$</td>
<td>$-(D_W + D_R)$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposits</td>
<td>$D_W$</td>
<td>$D_R$</td>
<td>$-D$</td>
<td>$D$</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>$E$</td>
<td>$-E$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>$D_W - D$</td>
<td>$D_R + E$</td>
<td>$K - E$</td>
<td>$D - (D_W + D_R)$</td>
<td>$K$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. The government sector is omitted from the balance sheet matrix because it holds no assets or liabilities.

### Table 3: Transaction Flow Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Workers</th>
<th>Rentiers</th>
<th>G’ment</th>
<th>Firms</th>
<th>Banks</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Sum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consumption by wage</td>
<td>$-C_W$</td>
<td>$-C_R$</td>
<td>$C_W + C_R$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption by debt</td>
<td>$-\dot{D}$</td>
<td>$\dot{D}$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>$W_p N$</td>
<td>$W_r \alpha N$</td>
<td>$-W$</td>
<td>$-\omega_s$</td>
<td>$-\omega_s$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages</td>
<td>$\omega_s$</td>
<td>$-W$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social wages</td>
<td>$\Pi$</td>
<td>$-\Pi$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firms’ profits</td>
<td>$t\Pi$</td>
<td>$t\Pi$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax</td>
<td>$iD_W$</td>
<td>$iD_R$</td>
<td>$-i(D_W + D_R)$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$iD$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposit interest</td>
<td>$-iD$</td>
<td>$iD$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan interest</td>
<td>$-i\dot{D}$</td>
<td>$\dot{D}$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposit flows</td>
<td>$\dot{D}_W$</td>
<td>$-\dot{D}_R$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan flows</td>
<td>$\dot{D}$</td>
<td>$\dot{D}$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity issues</td>
<td>$-\dot{E}$</td>
<td>$\dot{E}$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Sum</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B  Short-run model solution

Using equations (1), (2), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12), and (14) in combination with (15), and normalizing all variables by the capital stock, we obtain the following solutions for the rates of capacity utilization, profit and accumulation:

\[ u = \frac{\kappa_0 + id_R c_\pi (1 + \beta \eta)}{\{1 - c_\pi (1 + \beta \eta)(1 - t) - \beta t + \kappa_r \pi - \frac{[1 - \pi \alpha_{[W(1-\beta)+c_\pi(1+\beta \eta)\phi_\alpha]}}{1+\phi_\alpha}\}} \]

\[ r = \frac{\pi [\kappa_0 + id_R c_\pi (1 + \beta \eta)]}{\{1 - c_\pi (1 + \beta \eta)(1 - t) - \beta t + \kappa_r \pi - \frac{[1 - \pi \alpha_{[W(1-\beta)+c_\pi(1+\beta \eta)\phi_\alpha]}}{1+\phi_\alpha}\}} \]

\[ g_K = \kappa_0 + \frac{\kappa_r \pi [\kappa_0 + id_R c_\pi (1 + \beta \eta)]}{\{1 - c_\pi (1 + \beta \eta)(1 - t) - \beta t + \kappa_r \pi - \frac{[1 - \pi \alpha_{[W(1-\beta)+c_\pi(1+\beta \eta)\phi_\alpha]}}{1+\phi_\alpha}\}} \]

Appendix C  Debt dynamics

The debt dynamics of the system can be derived from the expression:

\[ d_R = \frac{D_R}{K} \]

\[ \Rightarrow \dot{d}_R = \dot{D}_R - \dot{K} \]

\[ \Rightarrow \dot{d}_R = \dot{D}_R d_R - g_K d_R = \frac{\dot{D}_R D_R}{D_R K} - g_K d_R \]

\[ \Rightarrow \dot{d}_R = \frac{\dot{D}_R}{K} - g_K d_R \] (C.1)

equation (C.1) being merely a re-statement of equation (17) from the main body of the paper. Now recall from equation (9) that total borrowing by working households is described as:

\[ \dot{D} = \beta (C^T - C_W) \]

Substituting equations (10), (11), (12), and (14) into this expression, we arrive at:

\[ \dot{D} = \beta (\eta c_\pi \phi_\alpha W_p N + (1 - t) \Pi + i D_R) - t \Pi - c_W W_p N \] (C.2)

Meanwhile, on the basis of equation (13), that part of borrowing by workers that is funded by the savings of working households themselves can be written as:

\[ \dot{D}_W = S_W = (1 - c_W) W_p N - i D_R \] (C.3)

Substituting equations (C.2) and (C.3) into equation (18), we now arrive at:

\[ \dot{D}_R = (\beta \eta c_\pi - t [\beta + \beta \eta c_\pi]) \Pi - (1 - \beta \eta \phi_\alpha c_\pi - (1 - \beta) c_W) W_p N + (1 + \beta \eta c_\pi) i D_R \] (C.4)
Finally, substituting equation (C.4) into equation (C.1) yields:

\[
\dot{d}_R = [(\beta \eta c_{\pi} - t(\beta + \beta \eta c_{\pi}))\pi - (1 - \beta \phi \omega c_{\pi} - (1 - \beta) c_{W})\omega]u + [(1 + \beta \eta c_{\pi})i - g_K]d_R
\]  

(C.5)

Inspection of (C.5) reveals that if \( g_K \) is increasing in \( d_R \), then we will observe \((1 + \beta \eta c_{\pi})i - g_K < 0\) at higher values of \( d_R \), so that \( \dot{d}_R \) will vary indirectly with \( d_R \) at higher values of \( d_R \). Under these conditions the debt dynamics of the system will conform to the “unconventional” (inverted U-shape) pattern discussed in sub-section 2.3.

Based on the parameter values reported in Table 1, equation (C.5) provides the basis for the simulations and discussion of neoliberal debt dynamics in section 3 of the paper.

References


